Demurrers to Answers: Changing the Practice of Drafting Defenses

Author: Scripta Ad Astra Staff

Usually, when answering an unverified complaint in California Superior Court, counsel for the defendant will file a general denial, along with a laundry list of “boilerplate” affirmative defenses that might apply to the plaintiff’s claims.  More often than not, the defendant’s answer will fail to include any specific facts supporting those defenses.

At first blush, this common practice may appear to be the result of sloppy or lazy work.  However, vagueness in the defendant’s answer is often a result of the fact that most defendants do not have the ability to prove their defenses at the initial answering phase, usually well-before conducting any discovery.  In addition, the defendant has significant incentive to be over-inclusive when it comes to affirmative defenses, as a party waives un-pled defenses.  An argument can be made that requiring specific facts at the preliminary answering phase of the proceeding may result in significant prejudice and a miscarriage of justice to the defendant who is unable to specifically plead all of its potential affirmative defenses.

On the other hand, the defendant’s inclusion of copious amounts of affirmative defenses that are not likely to ever be used in the case may be so excessive it borders on abuse.  More and more plaintiffs’ attorneys are bringing demurrers to the affirmative defenses in answers.  These demurrers are based upon the respective defendant’s failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense pursuant to the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.20.

Many practitioners on both sides do not realize that the affirmative defenses stated in the answer must aver facts as carefully and with as much detail as the facts which constitute the cause of action alleged in the complaint: the defendant is required to plead ultimate facts, rather than evidentiary matters or legal conclusions.  See Doe v. City of Los Angeles, (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 531, 550, and FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384.  However, even where a defense is defectively pled, it may be allowed if the defendant’s pleading gives sufficient notice to enable the plaintiff to prepare to meet the defense, in part because un-pled defenses are waived.  See Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal. 4th 203, 240.

When the defendant has filed a factually unsupported answer, there is a strong probability that a judge will sustain the plaintiffs’ demurrer to the answer, but will simultaneously grant the defendant leave to amend.  Therefore, it is best practice to determine whether the demurrer is necessary.   The plaintiff’s attorney should ask whether the motion will ultimately save costs on discovery by eliminating meritless affirmative defenses at the outset, or whether it is going to burn attorney’s fees with little benefit to the client.  In cases with a “burning limits” insurance policy or with a defendant with limited funds, creating more work for your opponent ultimately reduces the funds available for settlement.  Expedient trial scheduling may also be adversely affected by a demurer to the answer.  Many courts have a considerable backlog for dates to hear demurrers, and, as result, the demurrer may still be pending at the time of the initial case management conference. When that happens, because the case is not at issue, the likelihood of obtaining the earliest-possible trial date is slim to none.  The defendant’s attorney faced with a demurrer to the answer must determine whether it is cost-effective to oppose a motion that will likely be granted, or to offer to amend the answer.  Although unlikely, a court could potentially sustain the demurrer as to some or all of the affirmative defenses without leave to amend.

The answering defendant is in the position of avoiding the situation altogether by being more careful in drafting affirmative defenses.  However, if there is a dispute as to the factual sufficiency of affirmative defenses in an answer, the most expedient solution is to simply attempt to informally resolve the dispute by meeting and conferring with opposing counsel to discuss the defenses.  If possible, the parties should agree to amend the answer to remove unnecessary affirmative defenses and include some facts within the defendant’s knowledge to give notice of the bases for the meritorious defenses.
If the parties can be reasonable and informally resolve their dispute, they will: (1) avoid unnecessary attorneys’ fees (which the clients will appreciate), (2) advance the case beyond the pleading phase (which the attorneys should appreciate), and (3) prevent excessive motion practice in the already-over-burdened courts (which the judge will appreciate).

Is Leap Vulnerable to Disability Access Lawsuits?

           

Written by Michael S. Dorsi

Leap, a new comfortable-looking private bus service in San Francisco, recently came under scrutiny for removing wheelchair accessibility equipment from buses it purchased and retrofitted. Chris Pangilinan, a former San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency engineer, recently filed a complaint with the Department of Justice alleging that Leap violated the  Americans with Disabilities Act.


President George H.W. Bush signing the Americans with Disabilities Act into law.

If anything, it is surprising that Leap has not already been sued. Hotel and restaurant owners in California are often familiar with so-called “serial plaintiffs  who bring hundreds— sometimes thousands — of disability access lawsuits. They keep doing so because the law favors their cases.

A person harmed by a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act may sue under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act.[1] Successful plaintiffs are awarded damages of triple the harm suffered, no less than $4000, plus mandatory attorneys’ fees.[2] Attorneys’ fees are only available to plaintiffs; defendants may not recover their fees even if they win a defense verdict.[3] The damages and fees rules create a strong incentive for defendants to quickly settle their cases and remedy any conditions that do not conform to ADA rules.


California State Assembly Speaker Jesse Unruh, after whom the Unruh Civil Rights Act is named, with Willie Brown, who would go on to serve as Assembly Speaker after Unruh’s retirement.

The Unruh Civil Rights Act does require that the plaintiff be directly harmed.[4] Mr. Pangilinan, who now works in New York, may not be directly harmed, but there are likely other potential plaintiffs. Leap may have defenses, but defending an Unruh Civil Rights Act case is difficult, costly, and risky.

*Mr. Dorsi is an attorney with Ad Astra Law Group, who has represented plaintiffs and defendants in fee-shifting litigation under public interest statutes, including disability access litigation the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

[1] Cal. Civil Code § 51(f).

[2] Cal. Civil Code § 52(a).

[3] Turner v. Association of American Medical Colleges, 193 Cal.App. 4th 1047, 1060 (2011).

[4] Surrey v. TrueBeginnings, LLC, 168 Cal. App. 4th 414, 420 (2008).

 

 

Where Can I Sue An App?

Written by Michael S. Dorsi

Smartphone applications, or apps, control an increasing share of internet traffic, and also an increasing share of litigation. Disputes about apps range from copyright infringement to contract disputes. But unlike car accidents or real estate disputes, there is no physical place where the wrongdoing happened. So where to sue? Where is the App Store? California?

The Rules of Jurisdiction

A person may only be sued either where the person is, or where the person may reasonably be called into court.[1] In the case of disputes concerning a specific product or service, the court will need to be satisfied that:

  1. The defendant has purposefully directed activities at the forum state,
  2. The plaintiff’s claim arises out of or relates to those activities, and
  3. The assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair.[2]

What About The Internet?

The expanded use of the internet in the mid-1990s forced courts to examine this test in a new light. Concerning the first part of the test — purposeful direction — a federal court in Pennsylvania set out the rule, known as the Zippo test, that has been adopted in most of the country: websites fall along a sliding scale, with websites that engaged in commercial interactions at end of the scale toward finding jurisdiction, and websites that did not interact with their users at all, just showing a page, at the other.[3] Many other courts adopted the sliding scale from Zippo.[4]

Are Apps Like Websites?

Courts have not yet clearly stated whether Apps will be treated like websites. Two cases show potentially different outcomes with Apps based on being filed in different districts. In Intercarrier Communs. LLC v. WhatsApp Inc.,[5] a federal court in Virginia found that customers using WhatsApp — an instant messenger application — was insufficient to find jurisdiction. Of note, WhatsApp users did not make purchases through WhatsApp, but paid third parties such as Apple and those third parties delivered the app to the user’s phone.

But in Zherebko v. Reutskyy,[6] a federal court in California concluded that an interactive app — in that case a game that sold hints to players — satisfied the first part of the personal jurisdiction test because, under the sliding scale from Zippo, the app was commercially interactive.

The court also found that the second part — the relation to activities in the forum state — was satisfied because according to Apple’s terms and conditions, title to the app transfers electronically through Apple in California.

Although the court concluded that the case did not satisfy the third part of the test — jurisdiction was not reasonable because none of the parties were from California — the court’s analysis indicated that California will be an one of the best places bring cases about iPhone apps, and future courts may reach a similar conclusion about Android apps. In effect, a plaintiff suing about a smartphone app may only need to prove the third part of the test in order to establish jurisdiction in California.

[1] See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).

[2] See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-77 (1985).

[3] See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).

[4] See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997).

[5] Intercarrier Communs. LLC v. WhatsApp Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131318 (E.D. Va. Sept. 12, 2013), available at https://casetext.com/case/intercarrier-commcns-llc-v-whatsapp-inc.

[6] Zherebko v. Reutskyy, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113493 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2013), available at https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/california/candce/3:2013cv00843/263828/31/0.pdf?ts=1377209210.

I’ve Been Hacked. Have I Been Damaged?

Pleading computer fraud damages

Written by Keenan W. Ng

Plaintiffs seem to have difficulty pleading damages related to computer fraud violations, including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. §1030), the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. § 2501), and the California Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (Cal. Penal Code § 502). While litigants simply seem confused as to what they are allowed to ask for, pleading damages is a fairly straightforward process as most courts interpret the requisite sections by their plain meaning.

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

The CFAA does not allow for traditional compensatory damages. Rather, the statute allows for the recovery of loss and damage as defined by the statute.

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Ellen Pao v. Kleiner Perkins: The Defense Risked a Split Verdict

Written by Michael Dorsi

As this post goes up, the jury in Ellen Pao v. Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield & Byers has been sent back to deliberate on the fourth claim — that Ellen Pao was fired in retaliation for her bringing this lawsuit.

The case has been closely watched for the scrutiny of the culture of Kleiner Perkins, venture capital, and Silicon Valley, which Ms. Pao’s attorneys characterized as a boy’s club. In the end, only two of the twelve jurors agreed with Ms. Pao’s case concerning gender discrimination, but two more found that Ms. Pao was the victim of retaliation.

While watching Kleiner Perkins’ attorney Lynne Hermle give her closing argument, I suspected that there could be a split verdict, finding Kleiner Perkins liable only for retaliation, not for gender discrimination.

What did not cross my mind in the audience was that the jury might end up without a sufficient majority on the fourth claim, or more bizarre result today: that the jury thought they had enough votes, but counted wrong.

Kleiner Perkins Story of Ellen Pao in Performance Reviews

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Opinion Roundup: California District Courts and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, July 2014 through February 2015 – Part Two

Author: Scripta Ad Astra Staff

This is the second part of a two part-series on federal district court opinions in California regarding the CFAA. The first part of this series can be found here.

NetApp, Inc. v. Nimble Storage, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11406 (N.D. Cal. January 29, 2015)(“NetApp II”)

Judge: Lucy H. Koh, United States District Judge

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Opinion Roundup: California District Courts and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, July 2014 through February 2015 – Part One

Author: Scripta Ad Astra Staff

This week, we will have a two-part series on all of the substantive California district court Computer Fraud and Abuse Act opinions from July 2014 through February 2015. These posts are a follow up to a three – part series I wrote last summer discussing CFAA opinions from January 2014 through June 2014.

I decided to include some 2015 opinions in this Round Up because (1) there were not that many substantive opinions in the latter half of 2014 and (2) because I was a bit tardy on getting this post up – I figured I would bring you up to speed.

The next post will be on Friday, March 20. I hope you check it out!

Sprint Solutions, Inc. v. Pacific Cellupage Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101397 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2014)

Judge: Christina A. Snyder, United States District Judge.

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NovelPoster Files Amicus Brief in United States v. Nosal

Written by Michael S. Dorsi

San Francisco-based NovelPoster, having settled its Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) claim against Javitch Canfield Group, filed a brief as amicus curiae in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case of United States v. Nosal (9th Cir. Case Nos. 14-10037 and 14-10275).

While the NovelPoster and Nosal cases originated differently — NovelPoster was a civil action and Nosal is a criminal prosecution — both cases touched on an important question: is a person liable under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for acting without authorization — a term that applies equally in civil lawsuits and criminal prosecutions — if the actions in question did not involve circumventing a technical or code-based access barrier.

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Lenovo and Superfish Sued Under The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

Written by Keenan W. Ng

It was recently discovered that Lenovo has been selling laptops with preinstalled adware that creates a catastrophic security hole in the web browser leaving users vulnerable to hacks. Superfish, a small company in Palo Alto, develops the adware. Plenty has been written about the technical aspects of the security flaw and more will be written going forward.  As the ramifications of the Superfish vulnerability play out in the community, at least two lawsuits* have been filed. More lawsuits certainly will come. One of these cases, Sterling International Consulting Group (“SICG”) v. Lenovo, Inc. and Superfish, Inc.(collectively, “Lenovo”), alleges violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. SICG seeks class action certification and was filed in the Northern District of California. The problem with Sterling is that the plaintiffs may have a hard time establishing the authorization element of the CFAA.

Allegations

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Opinion Roundup: California District Courts and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act – January 2014 through June 2014 – Part Three

Author: Scripta Ad Astra Staff

This is the third part of three part-series on federal district court opinions in California regarding the CFAA.  The first part of this series can be found here.  The second part of this series can be found here.

Overall, California district courts have regularly followed the holdings in Nosaland Brekka regarding “use” versus “access.”  In summary, courts in the Ninth Circuit have generally held that the CFAA does not prohibit misusing information, such as in a trade secrets misappropriation violation: if you are allowed to access information, what you do with that information is not a violation of the CFAA, even if it is contrary to the interests of your employer.  On the other hand, if were not allowed to access information – say you quit or were fired – then a CFAA claim could likely withstand Ninth Circuit scrutiny.

It will be interesting to see how the courts make their decisions, especially as the divide between employment-based CFAA claims (“inside hacker” claims) and non-employment-based (external “hacker” claims) become more prevalent. Of course, you can always come back to Scripta Ad Astra to read about the latest CFAA, computer crimes, and cyber security developments.

NetApp, Inc. v. Nimble Storage, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65818 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2014)
Judge: Lucy H. Koh, United States District Judge.

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